作　者：祝雅柠
关键词：反垄断法；平台经济；威慑理论；垄断损失；责任竞合；损害赔偿；行政责任
摘　要：

在反垄断法实施过程中，我国司法与执法针对同一违法垄断行为的规制会发生损害赔偿责任与行政责任的竞合。传统部门法理论强调行政处罚与民事损害赔偿之间的区别，并未考虑在同一垄断违法行为上同时适用行政责任与损害赔偿会导致责任重叠，从而对垄断行为产生过度威慑。法经济学的威慑理论认为，民法中的损害赔偿与行政法中的罚款之间除了有量的差异外并无质的区别，行政责任与损害赔偿具有共通的威慑逻辑，即行为人从事违法行为需要付出的成本高于其收益，这为衡量反垄断法律责任威慑垄断行为的威慑效果提供了评价基础。在反垄断损害赔偿与行政责任竞合的情况下，我国司法实践的做法是并立适用，因而有必要通过合理方案解决损害赔偿与行政责任的适用冲突问题。具体建议包括：授权反垄断执法机构界定损害赔偿责任、协调反垄断民事公益诉讼中的损害赔偿与行政责任，以及承认行政处罚决定在后继损害赔偿诉讼中的证明效力。

 

The Concurremce, Conflict and Resolution of Liability for Civil Damage and Administrative Liability in The Antimonopoly Law

Zhu Yaning (Dalian Maritime University)

Abstract During the implementation of The Antimonopoly Law, there may be a concurrence between civil liability for damages and administrative liability for the same monopoly behavior in terms of legislation and law enforcement. Although traditional departmental laws emphasize the difference between administrative penalties and civil compensation for damages, without considering the fact that the application of liability for damages and administrative liability will form a dual regulation, leading to excessive deterrence. From the perspective of deterrence theory in the economics of the law, civil liability for damages and administrative liability differ only in quantity but not in essence; both institutions have a common deterrence logic, i.e. the cost of an illegal activity is higher than its benefits, which provides a basis for evaluating the deterrence effect of The Antimonoply Law on monopolistic behaviors. Considering that the current legislation has established the simultaneous application of civil liability for damages and administrative liability, it is necessary to address the issue of excessive deterrence in the simultaneous application of both ones through reasonable solutions, including authorizing antimonopoly law enforcement agencies to define liability for damages, coordinating the amount of damage compensation and administrative fines in antimonopoly civil public interest litigation, and recognizing the legal effect of administrative penalty decisions in the follow-on civil action.

Key words The Antimonopoly Law; platform economy; deterrence theory; monopoly losses; liability overlap; civil liability for damages; administrative liability

 

■作者简介 祝雅柠，法学博士，大连海事大学法学院讲师、硕士生导师；辽宁 大连 116026。

[PDF]（下载数：）